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NOTE
ANTIQUES ROADSHOW: THE COMMON LAW AND THE
COMING AGE OF GROUNDWATER MARKETING
Dean Baxtresser*
Groundwaterlaw in the United States is ill suited to deal with the
issue of groundwater marketing. As freshwater shortages become
more common with increasing population and a warming climate,
scholars and businesspeople are touting water markets as the solution to conservation and distribution, as well as a source of hefty
profits. T Boone Pickens-the famous oil tycoon of Texas-has
turned this concept into reality with his attempt to exploit the
groundwater of the Ogallala Aquifer in the Texas Panhandlefor
thirsty Texas cities. Despite the looming water shortages, however,
states have not adapted their laws to deal with the marketing issue.
As a result, the legality of groundwater marketing like the Pickens
Plan is currently decided by outdated laws that were never meant to
deal with groundwater marketing. In general, groundwatermarketing is only legal where the law permits off-tract use-an old
distinction that bears no relationship to the policy issues that must
be raised by state legislaturesto seriously address upcoming severe
water shortages. This Note examines the various legal doctrines in
the United States governing groundwater and determines that,
whetherfor or against water marketing, states should affirmatively
address the policy issues presented by the potential of marketing by
updating their laws so that they can deal with the new paradigm of
high-value groundwater in a thirsty age.
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"I know what people say-water's a lot like air. Do you charge for air?
Course not; you shouldn't charge for water. Well, OK, watch what happens. You won't have any water."
-T. Boone Pickens'
INTRODUCTION

T Boone Pickens, the oil tycoon of Texas, plans to pump groundwater
from an aquifer underneath his ranch in the Texas panhandle and sell it to
distant, thirsty cities. 2 His plan ("Pickens Plan" or "Plan") has attracted significant media attention and public controversy, both of which emphasize
that the Plan is a serious gamble in the struggle for a new resource commodity.' The land controlled by Pickens is arid, but underneath it runs
• 4 the largest
groundwater source in the country: the Ogallala Aquifer. Pickens's
company, Mesa Water, Inc., ("Mesa") claims it is ready to pump 323,000
acre-feet of water per year via pipeline to "regions that desperately need it."5
To date, no city has been willing to pay Mesa's price for water, yet Pickens
seems unconcerned, predicting a potential profit in groundwater sales of
$100 million-ten times the amount he has already invested. 6
The Pickens Plan represents a concept that has recently taken center
stage in water policy discussions: water marketing. As a commodity, water
has the potential to be sold as a natural resource for a price much higher
than most Americans pay today. Water in the United States is heavily subsi-

1. Chris Mayer, A Refreshing Idea, DAILY
dailywealth.com/archive/2007/jan/2007_jan 13.asp.

WEALTH,

Jan. 13, 2007, http://www.

2. Susan Berfield, There Will Be Water, Bus. WK., June 23, 2008, at 40, 40. For purposes
of this paper, "groundwater" is defined as any water underneath the surface of the earth. "Aquifers"
are "[g]eological formations in which groundwater is stored, and which will yield that water in a
usable quantity to a well or spring." JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 397 (4th ed. 2006). In regular parlance, the terms are often
interchanged with relatively little harm to overall meaning.
3. See, e.g., Berfield, supra note 2; Andrew Leckey, Resourceful Investors Add Water to
Portfolio; More Ways to Invest in Supply, Technology, CHI. TRIB., July 6, 2008, at C6; Doing Everything All at Once, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at WK2.
4.

See Berfield, supra note 2, at 42.

5. Background Overview of Mesa Water, Inc., http://www.mesawater.com/background.asp
(last visited Oct. 11, 2009). One acre-foot is equivalent to the amount of water necessary to cover
one acre of land to a depth of one foot.
6.

See Berfield, supra note 2, at 42.
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dized, particularly for farmers in the arid West.7 This subsidization incentivizes the use of large quantities of water, resulting in wasteful practices and
economically inefficient uses. These policies hide the real cost of water-a
cost that is climbing rapidly due to climate change and population growth,

both of which deplete freshwater supplies.
Proponents of water marketing argue that the market itself can regulate
supply and demand for water at realistic levels, thereby discouraging waste
and increasing conservation. s Massive increases in demand in the Western
United States have led many scholars to recommend water markets as a solution to the problems of conservation and reallocation.9 Market solutions
have even been proposed for heavily regulated supplies, such as the Colo-

rado River.'° Climate change has also been a rallying cry for water
marketing," since the scientific community predicts drastic decreases in
replenishment rates for freshwater basins. 2 Even the historically humid
Eastern United States will be affected by changes in precipitation patterns
caused by climate change, 3 and some scholars have taken the debate to the

Eastern
United States as well.14 The water-marketing concept has, by now,
entered the public consciousness. A few proposals have reached the
state

7. See Jedidiah Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987-2005, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021, 1021-24 (2007); Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1873, 1884-86 (2005).
8. See Glennon, supra note 7, at 1886-88; Noah D. Hall et al., Climate Change and Freshwater Resources, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2008, at 30, 35.
9.

See Glennon, supra note 7, at 1884-88; Hall et al., supra note 8, at 35.

10. See Robert Glennon & Michael J. Pearce, Transferring Mainstem Colorado River Water
Rights: The Arizona Experience, 49 ARiz. L. REV. 235 (2007).
11.

See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Water Marketing as an Adaptive Response to the Threat of
HAMLINE L. REV. 729 (2008).

Climate Change, 31
12.

For a detailed description of how climate change will affect freshwater supplies, see
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC TECHNICAL PAPER VI: CLIMATE
CHANGE AND WATER (2008), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-papers/climate-changewater-en.pdf [hereinafter IPCC TECHNICAL PAPER VI]. Generally, the decreased supplies will be
caused by changing precipitation patterns, decreased mountain snowmelt because of warmer spring
months, and lower recharge rates of groundwater aquifers due to the faster evaporation of rainwater
in warmer temperatures. Id. at 25-31.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL

13. See IPCC TECHNICAL PAPER VI, supra note 12, at 102; see also PETER H. GLEICK, U.S.
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, WATER: THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE
VARIABILITY AND CHANGE FOR THE WATER RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES (2000), available
at http://www.gcrio.org/NationalAssessment/water/water.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, Water Transfers: The Case Against Transbasin Diversions
in the Eastern States, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 249 (2007) (arguing for a different paradigm
for water supplies in the East that emphasizes the limits of local water supply and discourages
transbasin diversions).
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legislative
level,15 and the idea has even entered the realm of popular cul6
ture.'
Despite the commentary, debates, and pop-culture references, water
marketing has not yet significantly impacted the common law landscape for
groundwater allocation in the United States. More bluntly, the common law
groundwater doctrines throughout the country are stagnant, even in the face
of a potential marketing era. This is a considerable problem, since the
groundwater common laws in the United States are out of date and unsuited
to deal with the new paradigm of high-value
water. Many states place sig'7
nificant reliance on groundwater supplies, yet they still apply old common
law doctrines to allocate their groundwater. Most of these doctrines were
developed over one hundred years ago and were never intended to deal with
water shortages on such massive scales, nor the idea that water could be
treated as a finite natural resource. As a result, across the country, the very
laws that will determine the fate of groundwater marketing express no preference on the issue of groundwater marketing, and were enacted for
different purposes entirely. Under these laws, the legality of marketing often
rests upon an antiquated, and now-arbitrary, legal distinction of whether a
given doctrine permits off-tract use.18
With water shortages looming, whether or not a state allows groundwater marketing should be a policy decision made by a legislature, not by
the peculiarities of outdated laws. States should entertain the idea of
groundwater markets and express a clear preference on its legality through
legislation. Without this direction, state courts will likely have to resolve
groundwater-marketing disputes based on doctrines adopted under different value-systems for water, and precedent that is devoid of groundwater
policy considerations in this new era of climate change and shortage. Accordingly, this Note suggests that suitable groundwater policy from state
legislatures regarding groundwater marketing (regardless of the determination of legality) should involve at least these three factors inherent in water
allocation today: (1) efficient use, (2) balancing the utility of different uses
such as development, and (3) the expression of clear water policy regarding groundwater marketing on which people can rely without resorting to

15. See, e.g., Santos Gomez & Penn Loh, Communities and Water Markets: A Review of the
Model Water Transfer Act, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 689, 700-02 (2008) (discussing the proposed Model Water Transfer Act in California).
16. See, e.g., QUANTUM OF SOLACE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2008) (pitting James Bond
against a villain whose master plan is to take ownership of all of Bolivia's freshwater resourcespresumably because of the high value of the water).
17.

Roughly 20 percent of all water used in the United States comes from groundwater.

SUSAN S. HUTSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR
1268: ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2000, at 39 (2004), available at

http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2004/circl268/pdf/circularl268.pdf.
domestic purposes comes from groundwater. Id.

About 40 percent of water used for

18. "Off-tract use" is defined as the use of groundwater on land not directly above the aquifer from which the water originates.
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excessive judicial interpretations.' 9 None of the doctrines, as they stand
today, meet these three factors.
Therefore, this Note argues that groundwater laws in the United States
are inadequate to deal with groundwater marketing. As a case study, the
Note applies the country's different common law doctrines to the Pickens
Plan to explain the current legality of groundwater marketing. Part I summarizes the common law regimes that form the bedrock of groundwater law
and assesses the feasibility of the Pickens Plan under each doctrine. It concludes that the groundwater doctrines in the United States are not suited to
deal with marketing. Part II then argues that the Dormant Commerce Clause
and the public trust doctrine do not alleviate the need for a change in the
common law doctrines that address groundwater marketing. The Note concludes that state governments should proactively address the marketing
issue, as their laws inadequately deal with the potential for groundwater
marketing.
I.

GROUNDWATER MARKETS AND THE
COMMON LAW DOCTRINES

Because water allocation is governed at the state level, the United States
hosts as many water doctrines and legislative schemes as there are jurisdic-

tions. Vast regional differences in freshwater supplies contribute to the
differences in the law, as well as the fact that water allocation is instrumen-

talist law 20-practical law that is outcome driven.22' Instrumentalism has
allowed courts and states to maintain doctrines for as long as they are useful
and simply change the doctrines when the laws cease to provide the out-

come appropriate for the jurisdiction.22 Because states can have different
concepts of equitable distribution of water, the law can vary significantly
from one jurisdiction to another.

Nowhere in water-allocation law is the variety more pronounced than
with groundwater. Hugely different doctrines developed in the United States

because of differences in the supply and need for groundwater. Changing
scientific understandings also led to various approaches to groundwater allocation. Luckily, however, some states developed similar enough regimes
19. This Note is not the appropriate platform to discuss the individual merits of these factors
for groundwater policy. Rather, they are simply used as a tool to ascertain the suitability of groundwater law when dealing with the issue of marketing. The first factor of efficiency comes logically
from the water shortage problem due to population growth and climate change. The second factor of
utility is a nod to the reasonableness factors present in Section 850A of the Second Restatement of
Torts. The third factor derives from situations where the legislature provides such vague policy that
the marketing decision is left to the courts-a problematic situation that will be further explored
later in this Note.
20. Robert H. Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism:An Instrumentalist Theory of
Change, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381, 1388-90 (1989).
21.

For a detailed account of instrumentalism and its applicability to natural resources, see
(1982).

ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY

22. A major example of change in water law doctrine to meet the needs of people is the
abandonment of riparianism in the Western United States. See Abrams, supra note 20, at 1389.
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so that they can be grouped together for a broad analysis. At present, five
categories of groundwater common law doctrines govern different states
across the nation: (1) the doctrine of capture; (2) the "American" reasonable-use doctrine; (3) the correlative rights doctrine; (4) the doctrine of prior
appropriation; and (5) the Second Restatement of Torts' doctrine of reasonable use. 23 These categories are generalizations

that ignore smaller

differences in the laws of different states applying the same doctrine. They
are helpful for broad analysis, but should not be interpreted as suggesting
that courts of different states necessarily apply the doctrines in exactly the
same way.
24
Using the Pickens Plan as a case study, this Part assesses the legality of

groundwater marketing under each of the common law groundwater doctrines. 2' The history and applicability of the groundwater doctrines indicate
that they are unsuitable for the issue of marketing. As will be shown, the
major theme for marketing under the doctrines is the permissibility of offtract use. Though it is arbitrary and dated, the factor is dispositive of the
legality of marketing, since a groundwater market could not exist without
off-tract use. This is most certainly the case with the Pickens Plan, where
groundwater will be transported hundreds of miles through the desert to
thirsty cities lacking access to the Ogallala Aquifer.
A. The Doctrine of Capture

Predating groundwater marketing by more than a century, the doctrine
of capture is the oldest groundwater doctrine in America. It originates from
the English rule articulated in Acton v. Blundell, where the owner of a coal-

23. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 415-17. Scholars interpret the number and types of groundwater categories differently, which only serves to emphasize the difficulty of making
generalizations about groundwater law. See Dana M. Saeger, Comment, The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact: Groundwater, Fifth Amendment Takings, and the
Public Trust Doctrine, 12 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 114, 126 n.113 (2007).
24. It is important to note that the common law doctrines technically only determine private
rights of action, not the actual legality of groundwater withdrawals. Often, however, statutory provisions and state regulations mirror common law prohibitions. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72.1.1
(2008) (codifying the doctrine of prior appropriation in New Mexico); OHIO REV. CODE § 1521.17
(2008) (mirroring the requirements for reasonable use of water in the Second Restatement of Torts).
Furthermore, in the case of the Pickens Plan, injury to other water users can be assumed because of
the Plan's need for sizeable groundwater withdrawals in areas where water is highly valued.
25. The Pickens Plan is certainly not the only water-marketing venture in the world, but it is
currently the most prominent in the United States-making it ripe for analysis in this Note. Currently, a
limited form of water markets exists in California, see Water trading takes off in Golden State,
GREENWIRE, April 4, 2002, and Australia has operated a strong water-commodity program for some
time, see Rob Taylor, Australian Farms Make More Money Selling Water Than Growing Grain,Bus.
REP., Sept. 2, 2008, http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionld=565&fArticleld=4588994. Additionally, there are serious calls for water marketing in the developing world, see Tyler Cowen, Water:
Pay For It, FORBES, June 19, 2008, available at http://www.forbes.comI2008/06/19/deregulate-waterthirdworld-tech-water08-cxtc_0619monopoly-print.htm, as well as calls for water marketing in the
developed world, see MARCEL BOYER, MONTREAL ECON. INST., FRESHWATER EXPORTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF QUEBEC'S BLUE GOLD (2008), available at http://www.iedm.org/main/showpublications-en.phppublicationsjid=226.
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mine was sued for draining the wells on an adjacent parcel of land." The
English court assigned no liability to the mine owner, which perhaps best
describes the doctrine itself-it is a doctrine of zero liability. An owner of

land cannot be held liable for injury caused by withdrawals of groundwater
from a well or spring on the owner's land, regardless of the type or magnitude of the injury.27 The doctrine asserts that there are no rights to
groundwater until it is removed from the ground, and therefore there is not a

right to future water, nor even a right to subjacent support from groundwater
to prevent land subsidence.2 ' Hydrogeologically, groundwater from one well
certainly moves to another when both wells are above the same aquifer, but
under the doctrine of capture, this does not matter.29 Courts only attach liability in the limited circumstances of malicious withdrawals or pollution.0

Short of these exceptions, however, a landowner can do anything with the
groundwater once it is "captured"-including transfer the water off tract.
Many states have abandoned the doctrine of capture due to greater scientific understanding of groundwater and the inefficient use that the rule
encourages, 3' yet somewhat surprisingly, several states still maintain the
32
doctrine. Texas and Maine adhere to the doctrine, their courts having reaffirmed its applicability as recently as 1999."3 Other states, such as

Connecticut, may also retain the rule of capture because of a dearth of intervening case law stating otherwise.34 Even Colorado, a western state notable
152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1223-24 (Ex. Ch. 1843).
27. Kimberly Till Lisenby, Rights to Groundwater in Alabama and the Reasonable Use
Doctrine: An Assessment of Martin v. City of Linden, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (1997). Spite
pumping is the lone exception to this rule. Id.
26.

28. The most common form of injury resulting from groundwater withdrawals is the lowering of the water table of the aquifer. In rarer cases, the aquifer may be depleted. In extreme cases,
land subsidence due to lower water pressure can occur. The rule of capture offers no liability for any
of these damages. See, e.g., Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 2829 (Tex. 1978).
29. In fact, only one groundwater doctrine distinguishes groundwater movements-prior
appropriation. It does so poorly, and is a good lesson on why it is so difficult to apply groundwater
movement to the groundwater doctrines. For more on the hydrogeology of groundwater, see SAX ET
AL., supra note 2, at 397-411.
30. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at the
Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 41-42 (2002). Given the
difficulty in proving malice or pollution, the exceptions are rarely applied. See Alex W. Horton,
Comment, Where'd All the (Ground) Water Go? Three Approaches to Balancing Resource Efficiency with Rural Sustainability in Texas, 49 S. TEX. L. REv. 691, 698 (2008).
31.

See Dellapenna, supra note 30, at 41-45.

32. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 417. For an illuminating listing of the common law doctrines by states, see MATTHEW CHAPMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc., U.S.D.A. FOREST SERVICE
SOURCEBOOK OF STATE GROUNDWATER LAWS IN 2005 (2005),

available at http://www.fs.fed.us/

biology/resources/pubs/watershed/groundwater/stategw laws_2005.pdf. The accuracy of this
source is questionable, but as a general matter, it is an interesting compilation that shows where the
groundwater doctrines are generally applied in the United States.
33. For Texas's affirmation, see Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc., 1 S.W.3d
75 (Tex. 1999). For Maine's affirmation, see Maddocks v, Giles, 728 A.2d 150 (Me. 1999).
34. See Maddocks, 728 A.2d at 153 (listing cases that support the proposition that several
states continue to adhere to the rule of capture); Kirt Mayland, Navigating the Murky Waters of
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for being quick to replace the doctrine, has a statutory provision that indicates certain types of groundwater may still be governed by the doctrine of
capture.35
The doctrine of capture is unsuited to deal with groundwater marketing,
although the Pickens Plan would be legal under such a regime. Interestingly,
the Plan is actually being implemented in Texas, a long-time adherent to the
doctrine. Because there is zero liability for water withdrawals, no one
injured by the Pickens Plan would have standing to file suit. The Plan implicates none of the few exceptions to the zero liability of the rule: the act of
withdrawing water for sale does not by itself add pollutants to the groundwater, nor is its sole purpose the injury of another (a necessary component
for malicious withdrawals). Yet the origin of the doctrine in the nineteenth
century3 6 indicates that no state could have possibly considered groundwater
marketing before the adoption of the doctrine. Furthermore, the doctrine
discourages efficient use, and also does not examine the utility of different
uses for groundwater. This has the effect of discouraging development because the doctrine would not protect a groundwater marketer's investment in
a certain aquifer, should another user decide to deplete the aquifer. The lack
of protections for any kind of use, the encouragement of wasteful practices,
and the lack of any kind of policy considerations over marketing at the time
of the doctrine's creation indicate that the doctrine of capture is ill suited to
groundwater
marketing, and should be "consigned to the dustbin of his37
tory."
B. The Doctrine of American Reasonable Use
Many states that have abandoned the doctrine of capture have adopted
the doctrine of American reasonable use,38 but this doctrine is hardly an improvement for addressing the issue of groundwater marketing. The doctrine
is similar to the rule of capture in every respect but one: American reasonable use prohibits off-tract use. 39 Interestingly, scholars and courts add a
requirement of "reasonableness" to the doctrine, 40 but this "reasonableness"
Connecticut's Water Allocation Scheme, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 685, 708 (2006) (arguing that
Connecticut still applies the rule of capture for certain uses of groundwater based on precedent from
1850 that has never been overturned).
35. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-102 (2008) ("The doctrine of prior appropriation shall not
apply to nontributary ground water ....Such water shall be allocated as provided in this article
upon the basis of ownership of the overlying land.").
36.

See Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ch. 1843).

37.

See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 417.

38. Maddocks, 728 A.2d at 153; Dellapenna, supra note 30, at 44. Notably, several states in
the Southeastern United States use the doctrine of American reasonable use. See, e.g., Martin v. City
of Linden, 667 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 1995); Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663,
666 (Fla. 1979).
39. For an excellent judicial application of the doctrine of American reasonable use, see
Martin, 667 So. 2d 732, which held that groundwater may not be conveyed off the land--even to
benefit a municipality.
40.

See, e.g.,

SAX ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 415.
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factor does no work in any legal analysis. For courts, the on-tract use requirement functions as a proxy for reasonableness, while off-tract use is
always unreasonable. 4' Taking this into account, there is nothing reasonable
about the doctrine of American reasonable use at all. An on-tract use, however ridiculous and wasteful, will still meet the reasonableness requirement
by the standards that courts have used. Furthermore, the doctrine was
adopted by most states long before the rise of groundwater markets, and due

to its similarity to the doctrine of capture, suffers from the same problems
when applied to groundwater.
Though the Pickens Plan would not be legal in a jurisdiction applying
the doctrine of American reasonable use, the doctrine is still not suitable to
deal with groundwater marketing. The Plan necessarily requires off-tract use

for groundwater-something American reasonable use bars in no uncertain
terms. Yet, like its predecessor, the doctrine of capture, American reasonable
use does not consider the type of use to which the groundwater is put. Even

if the Pickens Plan were supplying a city with drinking water, a court would
likely prohibit it if applying the doctrine of American reasonable use. Public
municipalities do not even receive an exception under American reasonable
use, and would share the same fate as the Pickens Plan-failure. 4 ' This re-

sult shows the arbitrariness of the on-tract use requirement in American
reasonable use: it is an absolute bar that places no weight on beneficial uses,
discourages development, and encourages inefficient practices with on-tract
use. Regardless of whether a state is for or against groundwater marketing,
the doctrine of American reasonable use was never intended to deal with
water shortages necessitating the issue of marketing, and is now unsuited to

deal with the issue in its entirety.
C. The Doctrine of CorrelativeRights
As an alternative to the doctrine of American reasonable use, some
states adopted the doctrine of correlative rights43-arguably a more equitable
41.
Martin, 667 So. 2d at 738 ("A waste of water or a wasteful use of water was unreasonable only if it caused harm, and any nonwasteful use of water that caused harm was nevertheless
reasonable if it was made on or in connection with the overlying land .. " (quoting Henderson v.
Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900, 902 (Ala. 1980))); see also A. Dan Tarlock, Supplemental Groundwater IrrigationLaw: From Capture to Sharing, 73 Ky. L.J. 695, 703 (1985) (pointing
out that all off-tract use is per se unreasonable under the doctrine of American reasonable use).
However, courts have sometimes used their equitable powers to overcome the on-tract requirement.
L. William Staudenmaier, Between a Rock and a Dry Place: The Rural Water Supply Challengefor
Arizona, 49 ARiz. L. REv. 321, 326 (2007).
42. See Martin, 667 So. 2d 732 (giving a municipality no special treatment in applying the
doctrine of American reasonable use).
43. The California Supreme Court created the correlative rights doctrine in 1903, and the
state was, therefore, the first state to adopt the doctrine. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903)
(articulating the correlative rights doctrine). Several other states also adopted the correlative rights
doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Ponten, 463 P.2d 150, 153 (Wash. 1969) (reaffirming the doctrine of
correlative rights in Washington); Wrathall v. Johnson, 40 P.2d 755 (Utah 1935) (adopting the
doctrine of correlative rights in Utah); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971)
(distinguishing California's use of the correlative rights doctrine, yet applying a similar doctrine in
Missouri).
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doctrine, yet still unsuitable for the marketing issues that states will face.
Described as "riparianism on its side,"" the doctrine requires that groundwater be shared equitably among all overlying landowners 5 which essentially
means that during a shortage, on-tract users may use an amount of water
proportional to the amount of land they own that overlies the underlying
aquifer. 46 General scholarship and courts report that unlike American
reasonable use, this doctrine permits off-tract use.47 But this is a mischaracterization. Off-tract use is only allowed if the annual recharge of the aquifer
exceeds current withdrawals. 4' And since a surplus of water will always preclude the possibility of a conflict over the resource, this exception exists for
any of the groundwater doctrines. 49 Like doctrines that prohibit off-tract use,
though, in the event of a water shortage in a correlative rights jurisdiction,
off-tract uses become subservient to on-tract uses-meaning they are essentially prohibited.:
Like the prior doctrines, the correlative rights doctrine is not suited to
deal with groundwater markets. The doctrine effectively prohibits the Pickens Plan, though not because of a policy decision about groundwater
marketing. Rather, it is merely because the doctrine of correlative rights
effectively prohibits off-tract use. Arguably, the doctrine does not prohibit
off-tract use as completely as American reasonable use. However, the Pickens Plan could only be successful in a shortage situation. The amount of
water necessary for the Pickens Plan would undoubtedly exceed an aquifer's
available surplus-thereby creating a shortage-especially in areas where
the water would be worth enough to make the Plan economically feasible.
Given the unlikelihood and irrelevance of a surplus under correlative rights,
the Pickens Plan cannot succeed under this doctrine because of the practical
prohibition on off-tract use. This result shows the arbitrariness of the ontract use requirement. Like the doctrine of American reasonable use, the ban
places no weight on beneficial uses, thereby discouraging development, and
also encouraging inefficient practices with on-tract use. The correlative
rights doctrine was designed long ago in a time where groundwater market44. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 416. Riparianism is one of two common law doctrines governing surface water in the United States (the other being prior appropriation). The doctrine
essentially grants water use rights to owners of land adjacent to water. Riparians are entitled to
reasonable use of the adjacent water, however, there are often limitations on how much they can use
so that they do not unreasonably interfere with the riparian rights of others. See id. at 27-37.
45.

Id.

46. 93 C.J.S. Waters § 204 (2009); Ronald Kaiser & Frank F. Skillem, Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 249,
267 (2001).
47.

Kaiser & Skillem, supra note 46, at 267.

48.

See id.

49. Regardless of the regime, so long as there is always enough water, no one will litigate
the issue of water shortage. Therefore, from a practical standpoint, it does not matter if there is an
off-tract prohibition.
50. For a modern judicial application of this dilemma, see In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka 'i, Inc., 83
P.3d 664, 711 (Haw. 2004) (adopting the correlative rights doctrine for all groundwater in Hawaii,
and, therefore, finding off-tract use to be subservient to on-tract use).
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ing was not contemplated, and the doctrine fails to deal with any of the policy issues of groundwater marketing.
D. The Doctrine of PriorAppropriation

Among all the common law doctrines, the doctrine of prior appropriation is uniquely unsuitable for all groundwater allocation issues, not only
marketing. It is the only groundwater doctrine to have its origin in a surface-water allocation scheme. Prior appropriation is the main common law
doctrine governing surface water in the Western United States, and some
western states also apply it, with difficulty, to groundwater.5' The groundwater system essentially mimics the surface-water doctrine, in that rights to
groundwater are "[1] obtained by putting the water to a beneficial use; [2]
have a specified point of diversion and are quantified as to amount; [3] can
be lost for non-use; and [4] can be transferred so long as no harm is suffered
by other water rights holders" 5 2 In the event of conflict between two or more
users, temporal priority is the determining factor in water allocation.53 This
priority system differs from a correlative rights allocation, which hinges on
the amount of property overlying the basin.
Applying prior appropriation-a surface-water doctrine-to groundwater presents serious problems that show the doctrine's lack of applicability to
dealing with marketing issues, as well as its unsuitability for the Pickens
Plan. The doctrine presents two fundamental problems when applied to
groundwater. First, shallow well depth may cause a senior appropriator to
lose the ability to extract water even though there is water available to extract. A solution in this case is for the junior withdrawer to compensate the
senior for increasing the well depth-or transferring water from the junior's
own well. However, tracing liability underground is problematic, especially
in conflicts involving a large number of water withdrawers and a sizeable
underlying aquifer. 4 This difficulty is compounded by the second problem-the slow moving nature of groundwater. Well shortages can take place
after a significant amount of time has passed since the junior began extracting water. Because years may pass before injury is suffered, determining
causality can be an administrative nightmare."

51. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 439. Examples of states in the Western United States
that have adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation include Idaho, North Dakota, and New Mexico. See Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 154 P.3d 433 (Idaho 2007);
Volkmann v. City of Crosby, 120 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1963); State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority, 225 P.2d
1007 (N.M. 1950).
52. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 439; see also A. Dan Tarlock, PriorAppropriation:Rule,
Principle,or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REv. 881,882 (2000).
53.

See SAX

54.

See id.

ET AL.,

supranote 2, at 439.

55. See Tarlock, supra note 52, at 900; Matthew S. Tisdale, Note, The Price of Thirst: The
Trend Towards the Privatizationof Water and its Effect on Private Water Rights, 37 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv.535, 541 (2004).
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Though the Pickens Plan would not fail under the doctrine of prior appropriation because of an off-tract
use prohibition (there is no such
16
prohibition under the doctrine), the Plan would likely not succeed because
of the problems with the doctrine and the difficulty of acquiring temporal
rights to groundwater. Under any prior appropriation scheme, temporal
rights to groundwater are difficult to acquire, as most of these rights have
been appropriated since the nineteenth century. 7 Since the Pickens Plan
requires rights to groundwater, they would have to be purchased, and the
price for such rights would be exceedingly high in areas where the Pickens
Plan would be most profitable. Legal challenges would also be costly, as the
doctrine of prior appropriation engenders lawsuits. Altering the use of a preexisting appropriation usually requires government approval, and the
massive withdrawals necessary for the Pickens Plan could injure other users.
Furthermore, there is always the danger of purchasing rights that already
have liability attached. Finally, the well-documented problems of the doctrine as applied to groundwater raise the concern that a court may simply
find prior appropriation unworkable with the Pickens Plan, and change the
law rather than deal with the difficulties. 8 Significant investment could be
lost because of the failings of the doctrine and the instrumental nature of
water law.
The likely failure of the Pickens Plan under the doctrine of prior appropriation highlights the doctrine's unsuitability for dealing with marketing.
Obviously, a doctrine with such fundamental problems when generally applied to groundwater could not be well suited for the issue of groundwater
marketing. Beyond that, however, the inadvertent administrative nightmare
that would undoubtedly result in prohibitive transaction costs for groundwater marketing provides a disincentive to market that was never approved by
any legislature. Even if a legislature wanted to discourage marketing, this is
certainly an odd way to do it. Prior appropriation was first adopted as a tool
to encourage development, 9 but it now, ironically, frustrates this goal by
encouraging inefficient use. Therefore, the history and current effect of the
doctrine indicate that prior appropriation is completely unsuitable to deal
with groundwater marketing.
E. The Second Restatement of Torts'Doctrineof Reasonable Use

The Second Restatement of Torts' doctrine of reasonable use ("Restatement") is the most modem of all the groundwater doctrines, but it too is ill
56. Off-tract use in jurisdictions using the doctrine of prior appropriation is actually quite
prevalent. See A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of Watershed
Management in the United States, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1059, 1072-73
(2008) (providing examples of watershed diversions).
57.

See SAX

ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 439-42.

58. See id.; see also Tarlock, supra note 55 (arguing that the doctrine of prior appropriation
hurts nonrenewable resources, such as groundwater aquifers).
59. Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59
679,696 (2008).

ALA.

L. REV.
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suited to deal with the issue of marketing. Under the doctrine, water withdrawals attach zero liability in the event of damage, provided the water is
used for a beneficial purpose. 60 The doctrine substantially departs from other
zero liability schemes-like the doctrines of capture and American reasonable use-because of three exceptions to its general liability rule. A
withdrawer may not unreasonably cause harm by lowering the water table or
lessening artesian pressure, 6' exceed a reasonable share of the annual supply,
or cause harm to someone with rights to affected surface water."
Notably, the Restatement makes no distinction between on- and off-tract
use-thereby tacitly permitting off-tract use, such as that of the Pickens
Plan. The Restatement also specifically departs from the interpretation of
what is "reasonable" under the doctrine of American reasonable use. Rather
than being subsumed by an on-off-tract distinction,63 "reasonable use" has a
working definition under the Restatement that requires courts to substantively evaluate the reasonableness of particular uses. To aid in the
determination of reasonable use, the Restatement simply applies the reasonable-use factors from its section on surface water.64 These factors include:
the purpose of the use; the suitability of the use; the economic value of the
use; the social value of the use; the extent and amount of the harm the use
causes; the practicality of avoiding the harm; the practicality of adjusting the
amount of water used; the protection of existing values of water uses; and
the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear the loss." Given the
large number of factors, as well as the broad language of each, courts have
acknowledged they have great latitude in adjudicating water disputes. 6' The
factors in the Restatement help to guide courts, but their breadth allows
courts to exercise broad discretion in deciding groundwater allocation disputes.
Whether the Pickens Plan would be legal in a jurisdiction applying the
Restatement largely depends on a court's interpretation of the doctrine. Like
the rule of capture and prior appropriation, the Restatement does not prohibit off-tract use of groundwater. But the major hurdle facing the Pickens

60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979). Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Ohio have
all adopted some form of the Restatement doctrine. See Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d
116, 132 (Neb. 2005); Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ohio 1984); State v.
Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 350 (Wis. 1974) (adopting the proposed rule for
the Second Restatement).
61. Artesian aquifers are under pressure that forces groundwater to the surface when an
opening is made in the aquifer, such as a well. That pressure is known as "artesian pressure." For
more information, see U.S. Geologic Survey Website, Water Science for Schools (last visited Oct.
6, 2009), http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/gwartesian.html.
§ 858.

62.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

63.

See supra Section I.B (regarding the American reasonable-use doctrine).

64.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

65.

Id. § 850A.

§ 858 cmt. d.

66. See, e.g., Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116, 132 (Neb. 2005) ("[W]hen
applying the Restatement, the fact finder has flexibility to consider many factors such as those listed
in § 850A, along with other factors that could affect a determination of reasonable use.").
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Plan under the Restatement would be the requirement that the use be reasonable. This requirement is much more fluid and malleable than a strict
off-tract prohibition. The factors listed in the Restatement provide many
grounds for debate, but the feasibility of the Pickens Plan would likely hinge
on whether the water source would be harmed, whether a solution could be
reached between parties, and whether the use by the Plan would be of
greater value than other uses.
The problem with applying this doctrine to groundwater marketing is the
wide latitude courts have to decide allocation issues. The number of factors
courts can consider allows them to pick and choose--essentially granting
them the ability to rule either way on the issue of groundwater marketing
depending on what factors they choose to emphasize. A court could argue
that marketing (for municipal supply) outweighs rural use (namely, agricultural uses like irrigation), taking into account the number of people
benefiting from the groundwater, the development potential, and the economic value of the water provided by something like the Pickens Plan. But a
court could just as easily argue that the harm caused to the rural uses would
be too great, considering that a municipality could get its water from somewhere else, could conserve more, and could more easily deal with the
damage of less water. Under a doctrine like this, there is clearly a lack of
policy direction from a state legislature on groundwater marketing, thereby
indicating its unsuitability to the water marketing debate.
Furthermore, the doctrine places the determination of the legality of
groundwater marketing squarely within the realm of the courts, not the legislature. This is an untenable situation, given the significant policy and
political considerations at stake in the debate over the marketing of groundwater. Though the Restatement meets the first two policy factors that
indicate suitability for dealing with groundwater marketing, the doctrine
remains just as unsuitable for dealing with the issue of marketing because
courts have wide latitude to resolve the question due to the lack of clear policy guidance from the legislature.
F. DoctrinalSolutions

The application of the five groundwater common law doctrines to the
Pickens Plan illustrates how the doctrines are unsuitable for dealing with
the issue of groundwater marketing. States are, however, not limited to the
five common law doctrines outlined above. They could, perhaps, alter the
doctrines to provide more guidance for groundwater-marketing issues.
Michigan's recent approach to groundwater disputes provides a good
example of a hybrid system that the court used to approach one groundwater-marketing issue-bottled water.67

67. Bottled water has been a catalyst for water disputes in many local regions throughout the
country. For an overview of the bottled water issue and its legal effects, see Noah D. Hall, Protecting
FreshwaterResources in the Era of Global Water Markets: Lessons Learnedfrom Bottled Water, 13
U. DENY. WATER L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract= 1473844.
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In Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl Waters North
America, Inc.,68 the Michigan Court of Appeals adopted a hybrid approach
between the Restatement and the correlative rights doctrines. Essentially, the
court added an on-tract use factor to the other factors present in the Restatement, and gave the factor preferential consideration. In Michigan, then,
off-tract use of groundwater must be well justified by the factors in the Restatement, because such use is normally discouraged. This approach
provides more guidance for marketing, since on-tract use is specifically preferred, even in a marketing situation (such as the situation with Nestle).
But even this approach has its problems. The broad, sweeping factors of
the Restatement still provide latitude for courts to decide issues however
they want. Though the Michigan court specified that on-tract use was to be
heavily favored in an analysis, it did not specify how that favorability was to
be applied. Thus, the uncertainty that renders the Restatement approach unsuitable for groundwater regulation renders Michigan's doctrine equally
unsuitable to deal with groundwater marketing. More problematically, the
hybrid doctrine represents a judicial approach to the important issue of
groundwater marketing-a decision that the legislature should be making
instead, given the important policy implications of groundwater marketing.
In this respect, all judicial modifications of the common law doctrines in
order to deal with groundwater marketing will be essentially legislating
from the bench. For the issue of groundwater marketing, this is unfortunate,
even if groundwater allocation law is instrumentalist in nature. Regardless,
Michigan's modified doctrine provides guidance for how to judicially approach the legal issues presented by groundwater marketing.

1I. No WAY

AROUND THE DOCTRINES

Scholarship on both sides of the groundwater-marketing debate intimates that other established laws address the issue of marketing, thereby
making it unnecessary for states to affirmatively address the problems with
their common law doctrines. Some commentators hail the Dormant Commerce Clause as evidence of the legality of water marketing, or at least as a
dangerous slope that states will have to navigate, should they legalize
groundwater markets within their borders. Meanwhile antimarket commentators perpetually cite the public trust doctrine as a legal reason why
marketing cannot be permitted. In reality, however, these issues do not advance the groundwater-marketing debate at all. The federal government
could regulate groundwater, but it does not. It rarely involves itself in water
marketing. On the other side, the public trust doctrine does not apply to
groundwater. This Part details why these issues have little impact on
groundwater markets and the common law doctrines. The fact that these
issues do nothing for the groundwater-marketing debate serves to emphasize
that states must address the possibility of groundwater markets through their

68.

709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), modified, 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007).
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own groundwater laws. They will not be able to rely on other laws to do so
for them.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause

Some commentators point to Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
as a way to circumvent the restrictions (or permissions) of the common law
doctrines for groundwater markets; however, the influence of the Clause is
far overstated. 69 The Dormant Commerce Clause stands for the principle that
"state and local laws are unconstitutional if they place an undue burden on
interstate commerce."70 The Supreme Court's modem application of the
Dormant Commerce Clause indicates that state laws discriminating against
outsiders will be struck down, and those that do not discriminate will be
upheld, provided they do not place a burden on interstate commerce that
outweighs the benefit of the law.7
The defining intersection of groundwater and Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence occurred at the Supreme Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas.71 In the case, the Court emphasized that federal law
does not regulate groundwater allocation by noting Congress's deference to
state law in thirty-seven statutes, as well as the interstate water compacts
Congress approves." The Sporhase Court determined that groundwater is an

article of commerce, and the Court indicated that Congress would be permitted to regulate groundwater if it chose to do So. 74 The Court noted that

the states are not absolved from complying with the Constitution, regardless
of the deference of Congress. 7 To put this ruling in the broader rules of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, Nebraska essentially violated the Constitution
by banning interstate water sales where they would have been permitted
intrastate. This should not be construed, however, to mean that the Clause
has any effect over the legality of groundwater marketing; that power remains in the hands of the states.

69. As a whole, federal law rarely interferes with groundwater allocation at the state level,
meaning the federal government has little influence over groundwater marketing. See Marshall
Lawson, Transboundary Groundwater Pollution: The Impact of Evolving Groundwater Use Laws
On Salt Water Intrusion of the FloridianAquifer Along the South Carolina/GeorgiaBorder, 9 S.C.
ENVTL. L.J. 85, 90 (2000) (noting that Congress has left the area of groundwater allocation to the
states); Jack Tuholske, Trusting the Public Trust: Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to
Groundwater Resources, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 228 (2008). In fact, most courts have ruled that
the Clean Water Act does not apply to groundwater-thereby indicating that to be an area for state
law, as well. Id. at 228 n.269.
70.
2006).

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

419 (3d ed.

71. See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
338-39 (2007); CtIEMERINSKY, supranote 70, at 430.
72.

458 U.S. 941 (1982).

73.

Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959-60.

74.

Id. at 953-54.

75.

Id. at 959-60.
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Yet it is precisely this distinction that often confuses commentators, and
as a result, the commentary on Sporhase often exceeds the Court's actual
decision. Commentators have indicated that the Dormant Commerce Clause
prevents states from regulating groundwater exportation for marketing or
otherwise. This is incorrect. The recognition of groundwater as an article
of commerce only means that the Court would likely not prevent groundwater markets. The decision does little to explain whether Congress would
support or condemn such an idea.77 More importantly, however, while striking down Nebraska's ban on interstate groundwater export, the Court
provided an exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause in "times of severe
shortage, ' 78' and most states have taken advantage of this language.79 While it
remains an open question whether state statutes and local regulations banning
interstate water export would withstand Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny,
their mere presence currently chills the likelihood of interstate marketing,
since any attempt to do so would turn on an outcome at court.8° The economic
risk involved in such an undertaking might prove too extreme for groundwater
markets to attempt interstate water marketing where state law prohibits such
export-even if the law were unconstitutional. Indeed, it is the Court's ambiguity in Sporhase that underlines the effect and influence federal law has on
the legality of groundwater marketing: intrastate-zero impact; and interstate-little impact. As a result, states will find that federal law, in its current
form, will not deal with groundwater marketing for them. Congress could
regulate groundwater through the Commerce Clause, but given its past deference to state law, this is unlikely. Instead, states will have to affirmatively
address the issue of groundwater marketing with their own laws.
B. The Public Trust Doctrine
Though antimarketing commentators cite the public trust doctrine as the
definitive law that prohibits groundwater marketing, the doctrine does not
apply to groundwater, and therefore has no impact on the issue. The public
trust doctrine prevents states from divesting control of lands and resources
that benefit the public. The state holds such property in trust for the public
76. E.g., James M. Klebba, Water Rights and Water Policy in Louisiana: Laissez Faire
Riparianism,Market BasedApproaches, or a New Managerialism?,53 LA.L. REV. 1779, 1841-43
(1993); Wilson Barmeyer, Note, The Problem of Reallocation in a Regulated Riparian System:
Examining the Law in Georgia, 40 GA. L. REV. 207, 234-35 (2005).
77. Given Congress's reluctance in the past to regulate groundwater allocation, the fact that
groundwater regulation is traditionally a police power of the states, and the political nightmare that
would likely result if Congress attempted to nationalize regulation, it is probable that Congress will
not interfere with state groundwater markets should they become a reality.
78.

Sporhase,458 U.S. at 956.

79. Chris Seldin, Comment, Interstate Marketing of Indian Water Rights: The Impact of the
Commerce Clause, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1545, 1556 (1999).
80. Id. at 1557; see also Kenneth A. Hodson, Note, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutionality of Intrastate GroundwaterManagement Programs, 62 TEX. L. REV. 537, 557
(1983) (noting that the Supreme Court may uphold narrowly tailored groundwater-management
schemes designed for conservation).
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and may not assign private ownership to the property where it will not benefit the public. The doctrine is confusing and has no set boundaries. As a
general matter, though, it could be described as follows:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource
to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties."

This Section demonstrates that the public trust doctrine does not, and should
not, extend to groundwater, and therefore has no applicability to the
groundwater-market debate. Further, this Section explains that even if the
doctrine were extended to groundwater, it would not impact groundwater
markets without severe economic consequences that courts would never be
willing to take.
The public trust doctrine originally applied to the regulation and use of
navigable waters and the underlying lands. s2 The seminal case of Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois3 cemented the public trust doctrine in prohibiting a state from abdicating authority over an area in which it has a
responsibility to exercise its police powers." From this initial scope of navigable waterways, the public trust expanded to encompass recreational and
environmental protections over nonnavigable waters." Most states, however,
do not currently extend the public trust doctrine to groundwater.16 As a result, the doctrine, in its current form, does not affect groundwater marketing,
and therefore does not interfere with the disposition of the groundwater doctrines toward the issue.
Despite this, opponents of water marketing argue that the public trust
includes groundwater and that the doctrine prevents the sale of water. They
argue that the doctrine should be expanded to groundwater because courts
have expanded the public trust to encompass other areas-namely, recrea-

81. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 490 (1970).

82.
83.

See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 590.
146 U.S. 387 (1892).

84.

Sax, supra note 81, at 489.

85. See id; see also Erik Swenson, Comment, Public Trust Doctrine and Groundwater
Rights, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 363, 367-68 (1999).
86. See, e.g., Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters N. Am. Inc., 709
N.W.2d 174, 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), modified, 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007); R.D. Merrill Co.
v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 969 P.2d 458, 467 (Wash. 1999) (en banc); Memorandum from
Professor Noah D. Hall, Wayne State Univ. Law Sch. and Executive Dir. of the Great Lakes Envtl.
Law Ctr., to Senator Patricia L. Birkholz of the Michigan Legislature (Mar. 11, 2008) (on file with
author); see also Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General
as the Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 57, 83 (2005)
("Courts ... have been reluctant to expand the [public trust] doctrine to encompass actions affecting
groundwater.").
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tional and environmental uses of water." This analysis raises several problems, however. The uses protected by the doctrine are fundamentally
different from the uses of groundwater. Navigation, recreation, and environmental protection are all uses that do not consume water, while any use
of groundwater, by contrast, is a consumptive use. Once used, the rest of
the public cannot enjoy that same resource. Unless the argument is such
that groundwater should be protected from all use, the "logical" expansion
of the doctrine to groundwater does not follow. Furthermore, groundwater
use cannot meet a common requirement of public trust property-that
such property not be sold'8-as the very concept of groundwater withdrawals requires some sort of monetary exchange. Additionally, the
current
understanding
of the public trust doctrine rests on weak historical
••
•
89
justification -calling into question the precedential arguments that courts
use to justify the public trust. Persistent references to historical Roman
and English applications of the doctrine are incorrect and inapplicable to
the current interpretations of the doctrine, thus weakening the foundation
of public trust law in America. 9° Thus, an expansion of the public trust is a
difficult concept to square with the lack of historical foundation. Finally,
such an expansion of the doctrine would emphasize the lack of definitional
limits on the doctrine, and thus threaten all forms of private property. 9' It
would be all but impossible to apply the public trust doctrine to groundwa92
ter, yet limit the doctrine so it would not affect other forms of property.
Courts would not affect groundwater markets even if they extended the
public trust doctrine to groundwater. Such an extension could happen one of
two ways: maintaining the original justification behind the doctrine (applicable only to some groundwater), or creating a new justification (applicable
to all groundwater). By maintaining the original justification of the public
trust, courts could extend the doctrine only to groundwater that affects navigable waterways. This would make some sense, as courts have already

87.

See, e.g., Kanner, supra note 86, at 78-81; Swenson, supra note 85, at 367-68; Tuhol-

ske, supra note 69, at 217-18.
88.

Sax, supra note 81, at 477.

89. See James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths-A History of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (2007).
90.

See id.

91.

See id. at 96.

92. The public trust doctrine's justification-protecting navigable waterways-would have
to change if the doctrine were extended to protect groundwater. A new justification for groundwater
could easily lead to other forms of property falling under the public trust doctrine based on the same
justification. For example, if groundwater fell under the protection of the public trust doctrine because it was a necessary component for human life, the same logic could apply to coal, oil, and gas
reserves-as electricity and power also could be deemed necessary for human life. Alternatively, if
the logic for protecting groundwater was to preserve the environment, the same logic could apply to
lands necessary to save endangered species or even to preserve the atmosphere. Granted, environmental protections are statutorily prescribed; the difference here is that the public trust would enable
any citizen to sue for a violation at common law, and takings claims for deprivation of property
would not be recognized by courts.
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extended the public trust to include nonnavigable surface-water tributaries
of navigable waterways because of their effect on the navigable waterways.
This same logic used by the courts could be applied to groundwater. Yet
should this happen, the public trust would not simply prevent withdrawals of
groundwater. Instead, courts would consider the doctrine as a balancing factor when examining the beneficial uses of withdrawals.94 Therefore, this
kind of expansion would not prohibit groundwater marketing outright. Furthermore, this expansion would have limited effect, as it would only apply
to groundwater connected to surface water. Many sources of groundwater,
however, do not contribute to surface-water levels (the marketing plan proposed by T. Boone Pickens, discussed infra, plans to use one such source of
groundwater). Were courts to adopt such an expansion, there would be no
effect on groundwater in its entirety, and there would only be limited effect
on groundwater markets using groundwater connected to surface water.
By using a justification divorced from the original scope of the public
trust, maintaining navigable waterways, courts could apply the doctrine to
all groundwater. Such a justification would need to be a separate public right
to groundwater involving consumption. The doctrine would have to restrict
uses for groundwater and allow any citizen to bring suit to enforce protection of the resource. Yet if selling groundwater were inappropriate under the
doctrine, other manufacturers using large quantities of water for private gain
would also be suspect. In order to affect groundwater marketing, a court
would have to distinguish between that use, and other commercial uses for
groundwater (i.e., bottled water, soda bottling plants, industrial uses 9 )-a
nearly impossible task. Without this difference, the economic impact of extending the doctrine to all commercial groundwater uses would be extreme,
and courts would be hesitant to take such an action. Additionally, such an
extension would be an excessive change in state law that could easily be
seen as best left to the legislature. As a result of the economic consequences
and limitations on authority, a court is unlikely to extend the public trust
doctrine to the extent that groundwater marketing would be affected, even if
the doctrine were extended to all groundwater.
The current interpretation of the public trust doctrine has no bearing on
the legality of groundwater markets in any given state. Based on the logic
the courts have used to extend the doctrine, it is unlikely to be extended to
groundwater without redefining what the doctrine protects (an unlikely
proposition). Were the doctrine to apply to groundwater based on its effect
on surface water, the legality of groundwater marketing would be unaffected. Were the doctrine applied to all groundwater, the legality would
9 3

93. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 721
(Cal. 1983) (en banc).
94.

See id. at 728-29.

95. Many different types of industries use large quantities of freshwater, even in cases where
the finished product contains no water at all. The U.S. Geologic Survey states that in the year 2000,
industrial water use accounted for 3,570 million gallons of groundwater per day, not including public-supply deliveries to industrial users. HUTSON ET AL., supra note 17.
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remain unaffected because of the unwillingness of courts to wreak economic
havoc on groundwater users. 96 As a result, states will be unable to rely on the
public trust doctrine as a source of law that will decide the issue of groundwater marketing for them.
CONCLUSION

Residents in the area of the Texas Panhandle worry about their future livelihood if Mesa Water depletes the Ogallala Aquifer by selling its
groundwater to faraway cities.97 Mesa Water, in turn, rationalizes its efforts
by explaining that the aquifer contains "surplus" water that remains unused
by the residents of the sparsely populated overlying land, and that the water
is "stranded" without an infrastructure to transfer it to where it can be
used.98 These arguments over groundwater marketing roughly characterize
what state legislatures should examine when determining groundwater policy and formulating new laws governing groundwater allocation. Yet to a
large extent, this debate has yet to influence the laws governing groundwater
in the United States. As this Note makes clear, the common law doctrines in
the nation are outdated and not suited to deal with the marketing of groundwater. Currently, markets live or die based on the permissibility of off-tract
use-an arbitrary distinction that means almost nothing in the reality of today's developed world. Federal law provides no guidance on groundwater
marketing, preferring to leave the decision to the states, and the public trust
doctrine cannot be used to prevent groundwater marketing, as it does not
apply. Whether or not groundwater marketing is good or bad policy, the real
impact of the Pickens Plan alone emphasizes that it is a decision with severe
enough consequences that it deserves to be debated openly by state governments, who should affirmatively decide whether they want to encourage or
discourage groundwater marketing. It should not be left to the laws of the
past that have no basis to decide an issue with such significant consequences.

96. While inapplicable to groundwater withdrawals, the public trust doctrine may be suited
to protecting groundwater from pollution, as pollution can deprive the use of groundwater to all
users. Pollution of groundwater is a general harm that could be fixed by the public trust doctrine, as
some commentators already argue. See Kanner, supra note 86.
97.

Berfield, supra note 2.

98. Description of the Ogallala Aquifer, http://www.mesawater.comogallala.asp (last visited
Oct. 1, 2009).
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